Public health insurance design for children: The evolution from Medicaid to SCHIP by Rosenbaum, Sara J. et al.
1 
Public Health Insurance Design for Children: 
The Evolution from Medicaid to SCHIP 
Sara Rosenbaum, J.D., Anne Markus, J.D., Ph.D., M.H.S. 
and Colleen Sonosky, J.D.* 
Journal of  Health & Biomedical Law, 1 (2004): 1-47 
© 2004 Journal of  Health & Biomedical Law 
The Health & Biomedical Law Society of  Suffolk University Law School 
Introduction 
In 2005 Medicaid will turn 40, a momentous event in the life of  the largest 
and most complex of  all means-tested public entitlement programs.1  Since 1997, 
Medicaid has co-existed with the State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(SCHIP), a small program which covers a fraction of  the number of  Medicaid 
enrolled children but whose legislative structure looms large against its much- 
beleaguered companion. 2  To the unpracticed eye, SCHIP and Medicaid appear to 
be quite similar in design; in reality however, their differences could not be more 
profound, and it is in these differences that clear directions for Medicaid’s possible 
future become visible.3  It is these differences and their meaning for U.S. child 
health policy which are the subject of  this article. 
* Sara Rosenbaum, Harold and Jane Hirsh Professor of  Health Law and Policy and Chair of  the 
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Health & Health Services.  Anne Rossier Markus, Assistant Research Professor in the Department 
of  Health Policy at George Washington University School of  Public Health & Health Services. 
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1 Sara Rosenbaum & David Rousseau, Medicaid at Thirty Five, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7, 7-51 (2001); Sara 
Rosenbaum Health Policy Report: Medicaid, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 8, 635-640 (2002). 
2 Sara Rosenbaum et al., Devolution of  Authority and Public Health Insurance Design: National SCHIP 
Study Reveals an Impact on Low Income Children, 1 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. POL’Y 33, 33-61 (2002). 
3 Id.; Sara Rosenbaum, Barbara Smith, Colleen Sonosky, Lee Repasch & Anne Markus SCHIP Policy 
Brief  #1: State SCHIP Design and the Right to Coverage (The George Washington University Medical 
Center, Washington, D.C.), at http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/downloads/SCHIP_brief1.pdf  (Mar. 
2001) [hereinafter Policy Brief]; Sara Rosenbaum et al., SCHIP Policy Brief  #2: State Benefit Design 
Choices under SCHIP-Implications for Pediatric Health Care (The George Washington University Medical 
Center, Washington, D.C.), at http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/downloads/SCHIP_brief2.pdf  (May 
2001); Sara Rosenbaum et al., SCHIP Policy Brief  #3: Managed Care Purchasing under SCHIP-A 
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This analysis is an outgrowth of  a multi-year, multi-funder4 project whose 
aim was to gain an in-depth understanding of  state SCHIP implementation, and in 
particular, its implications for Medicaid’s extraordinary pediatric coverage design.5 
For nearly four decades, Medicaid’s unique coverage rules for children under 21, 
coupled with its extensive reach into the low-income population, have set the 
program apart from all other forms of  health insurance, public or private.  Even as 
the program has struggled to overcome inadequate provider participation and the 
critical health care access problems faced by the poor generally, Medicaid’s effect 
on access to pediatric health care has been significant, in no small part because of  
the singular nature of  its coverage.6  This design has supported not only the provision 
of  comprehensive pediatric medical care but also the health care component of  
the nation’s special education and child welfare systems, both of  which serve 
disproportionate numbers of  low-income children with special health needs.7 
Through its sheer reach into the nation’s maternity system (today Medicaid covers 
upwards of  40% of  all births in many states), the program essentially supports the 
national network of  services for high-risk pregnant women and newborns.8  In its 
long-term support for the children with serious physical and mental disabilities, 
Medicaid’s power for pediatric financing has attracted the attention even of  
Nationwide Analysis of  Freestanding SCHIP Contracts (The George Washington University Medical 
Center, Washington, D.C.), at http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/downloads/SCHIP_brief3.pdf  (Dec. 
2001). 
4 The Commonwealth Fund, David and Lucille Packard Foundation, Health Resources and Services 
Administration, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. 
5 See cases cited supra note 3. 
6 Andy Schneider, Rachel Garfield, Risa Elias, David Rousseau & Victoria Wachino, The Kaiser 
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, The Medicaid Resource Book, (2002) at http:// 
www.kff.org/medicaid/2236-index.cfm (last visited September 30, 2004). 
7 Victoria Wachino, Andy Schneider & David Rousseau, The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and 
the Uninsured, Financing the Medicaid Program: The Many Roles of  Federal and State Matching Funds, 
(2004) at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 4, 2004); Sara Rosenbaum, et. 
al., supra note 1; Alan Weil, There’s Something About Medicaid, HEALTH AFFAIRS, 22:1, (Feb. 2003 13- 
31). 
8 The Medicaid Program at a Glance, Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (The Henry 
J. Kaiser Family Foundation, February 2003), available at  http://www.kff.org/content/2003/200403/ 
200403.pdf; Medicaid: Fiscal Challenges to Coverage, Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 
(The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, May 2003), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/ 
loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm;  National Governor’s Association  Making 
Medicaid Better : Options to Allow States to Continue to Participate and to Bring the Program up to Date in 
Today’s Health Care Marketplace (March 15, 2002) at http://www.nga.org/cda/files/ 
MAKINGMEDICAIDBETTER.pdf. 
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Presidents, as witnessed by President Reagan’s 1982 intervention to ensure Medicaid 
home coverage for a young, respirator dependent Iowa child named Katie Beckett.9 
At the same time, the pediatric component of  Medicaid has proven to be quite 
controversial, triggering demands for reform by Governors and extensive litigation 
testing the limits of  the legal entitlement.10 
SCHIP shares Medicaid’s mission in its coverage of  low-income uninsured 
children but its coverage, as formulated in federal and state policy, represents a 
dramatic departure from Medicaid rules and principles.11  This departure was the 
result of  a legislative strategy, supported by some of  the nation’s best known 
children’s advocacy organizations, which culminated in the enactment of  a “not- 
Medicaid” pediatric health care financing scheme offering a financially generous 
alternative to the Medicaid legal entitlement.12  The strategy was brilliantly successful; 
states responded to the lure of  good money with few strings attached by rapidly 
implementing SCHIP and extending assistance to several million additional 
uninsured low-income children ineligible for Medicaid because of  state coverage 
limits.13 
Yet even as this expansion strategy succeeded, it has left many questions in 
its wake, not merely because of  the aggregate limitations placed on federal SCHIP 
funding, which in turn have led to enrollment caps and waiting lists, but also because 
of  the implications of  its program design for children whose health needs exceed 
the norm and who are heavily dependent on state health care and social supports.14 
9 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of  1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. 97-248. 
10 Fact Sheet: Medicaid Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment: Recent Case Developments. 
(National Health Law Program, Washington, D.C.) Feb. 2004 at www.healthlaw.org/pubs/ 
200402.EPSDT.cases.pdf. 
11 See cases cited supra note 3. 
12 Sara Rosenbaum & Colleen Sonosky, Who Speaks for America’s Children: The Role of  Child Advocates 
in Public Policy in Medicaid Reforms and SCHIP: Health Care Coverage and the Changing Policy 
Environment 81-104 (DeVita and Mosher-Williams ed., Urban Institute Press, 2001). 
13 Id. 
14 Genevieve Kenney & Debbie Chang, The State Children’s Health Insurance Program: Successes, 
Shortcomings, and Challenges, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS 5:51-62, at 57; Anne Markus et al., Kaiser Commission 
on Medicaid and the Uninsured, SCHIP-Enrolled Children with Special Health Care Needs: An Assessment 
of  Coordination Efforts Between State SCHIP and Title V Programs (2004); Sara Rosenbaum et al., (2002) 
State Insurance Design Choices Under Separately Administered SCHIP Programs: Implications 
for Pediatric Health Care (abstract) 2002 Annual Research Meeting. Academy for Health Services 
Research and Health Policy, Washington D.C., June 2002. 
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Two groups of  children in particular merit focus.  The first group consists 
of  children with moderate to serious physical and mental disabilities, whose health 
care needs for both “acute” and “long-term care” services transcend what typically 
would be found in a commercial insurance plan.  Some of  these children are eligible 
for Supplemental Security Income on the basis of  their severe disability, but the 
majority actually qualifies for Medicaid on the basis of  low family income.15 
The second group consists of  low-income infants, toddlers and young 
children who face an elevated risk of  developmental disability and delay, and whose 
health circumstances dictate a cluster of  services known in the pediatric literature 
as “early intervention.”16  These services consist of  a range of  physical and mental 
health therapies and stimulation services, preventive counseling and supports for 
parents and caregivers, and close developmental monitoring by appropriately trained 
health care specialists in child development.17 Early intervention is considered by 
child health experts to be a preventive health intervention.18  Strictly speaking 
however, the early intervention process is not necessarily “treatment” for a 
“diagnosed” condition, and the location of  the intervention may be in settings that 
have both an educational and preventive health mission (e.g., specialized child 
development settings).19 
As a result, early intervention is a care process which, like long-term care 
for chronic conditions, may lie beyond the reach of  commercial insurance norms.20 
15 Sara Rosenbaum, Report: Olmstead v. LC: Analysis and Implications for Medicaid Policy 12 (Center for 
Health Care Strategy, Inc., NJ, May, 2000). 
16 MICHAEL REGALADO & NEIL HALFON, PRIMARY CARE SERVICES: PROMOTING OPTIMAL CHILD 
DEVELOPMENT FROM BIRTH TO THREE YEARS, (The Commonwealth Fund, NY, 2002); Neil Halfon, 
Michael Regalado, Kathryn Taaffe McLearn, Alice Kuo & Kynna Wright, Building a Bridge from Birth 
to School: Improving Developmental and Behavioral Health Services for Young Children, at http:// 
www.cmwf.org/programs/child/halfon_bridge_bn_564.pdf  (May 2003) (last accessed October 
20, 2003). 
17 Id. 
18  BARBARA STARFIELD, PRIMARY CARE: CONCEPT, EVALUATION AND POLICY (Oxford University Press, 
New York, NY, 1974); Halfon, et. al. supra note 16. 
19 Sara Rosenbaum et al., Health Policy and Early Child Development: An Overview (New York, NY: The 
Commonwealth Fund, 2001). 
20 Id. 
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We focused our research on these two groups of  children, not simply because 
of  their elevated health care needs, but also because it is in the context of  these 
needs that Medicaid’s singular coverage design comes into evidence.21  We viewed 
state SCHIP implementation – undertaken during an exceptionally strong period 
of  economic growth and strength – as a natural experiment of  sorts, a test of  how 
states would design health care assistance for lower income children in the absence 
of  a federal legal entitlement to comprehensive coverage. 
This question – namely, what happens when state governments and health 
care markets are freed from the structural constraints of  Medicaid – is a critical one 
in national health policy.  As one of  Medicaid’s best analysts has observed, the 
program has been a “strongman” in the U.S. health system in ways which are not 
always fully appreciated.22  The press for fundamental Medicaid reforms has been 
presaged by the passage of  SCHIP, a large collection of  ongoing federally sanctioned 
Medicaid demonstrations conducted under the legal authority of  §1115 of  the 
Social Security Act, and most recently, the Medicaid provisions of  the Medicare 
Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of  2003,23 which eliminated 
federally assisted Medicaid prescription drug coverage for millions of  dually enrolled 
Medicare beneficiaries.24  Observers anticipate that the press for reform will reach 
a legislative crescendo as early as the 109th Congress, which convenes in 2005, in 
view of  the program’s perceived financial unsustainability and its fundamental 
21 Sara Rosenbaum et. al., SCHIP Policy Brief  #2: State Benefit Design Choices Under SCHIP-Implications 
for Pediatric Health Care (The George Washington University Medical Center, Washington D.C.), at 
http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/downloads/SCHIP-_brief2.pdf  (May 2001). 
22 Weil, supra note 7 at 57. 
23 42 U.S.C. §1395w-101 through §1395w-152. 
24 Cindy Mann, Georgetown University Institute for Health Care Research and Policy, The Bush 
Administration’s Medicaid and State Children’s Health Insurance Program Proposal (February 2003); Cindy 
Mann, et. al., Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Administration’s Medicaid Proposal Would Shift 
FiscalRisks to States (April 2003) at http://www.cbpp.org/4-1-03health.htm; Kaiser Commission 
on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2004.  The New Medicare Prescription Drug Law: Issues for Dual Eligibles 
with Disabilities and Serious Conditions (July 1, 2004) [hereinafter New Drug Law] at http://www.kff.org/ 
medicaid/7119.cfm (last visited October 2004). 
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incompatibility with modern notions of  federalism and market regulation.25  For 
this reason, the course of SCHIP implementation, along with these other policy 
developments, may offer critical lessons for Medicaid reform. 
The study of  SCHIP design takes on importance for other reasons as well. 
Across the spectrum of  preventive, routine, and long-term and extended care, the 
fact that coverage matters for children is a well established one.26  Where coverage 
shifts from rich and deep to more limited and narrow, the ability to finance the level 
and depth of  health care necessary to reach an appropriate standard of  care for 
children, particularly those with lower incomes and serious illnesses and disabilities 
may diminish.27  For this reason, understanding shifts in benefit design, which have 
implications for the range of  health services that can be supported, is of  the utmost 
importance.  In an era of  constricting concepts of  standard health insurance design, 
it becomes especially important to examine coverage design in depth, in terms of  
the classes of  services and benefits offered, the services, treatments, and conditions 
that are excluded, the service definitions used, and the standard of  medical necessity 
governing the provision of  covered services.28  Understanding how variations in 
coverage design, at both the macro and individual level, ultimately influence access 
to and use of  health care is actually not particularly well researched, because of  the 
difficulties inherent in using large population and coverage data sets to analyze 
25 John K. Iglehart, The Dilemma of  Medicaid, 348(21) NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 2140 (2003); Weil supra 
note 7; John Holahan & Alan Weil, Medicaid moving in the wrong direction? (Urban Institute, Washington, 
D.C., June 18, 2003), available at http://www.urban.org/urlprint.cfm?ID=8453; John Holahan & 
Alan Weil, Block Grants are the Wrong Prescription for Medicaid, HEALTH POLICY ONLINE (Urban Institute, 
Washington, D.C.), at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/900624-HPOnline-6.pdf. 
26 The David and Lucille Packard Foundation, Health Insurance for Children, Future of  Children 
(Spring 2003) available at http://www.futureofchildren.org (last modified Spring 2003); Children’s 
Health – Why Health Insurance Matters, Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (The 
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, May 2002) ,available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/ 
loader.cfm; Lisa Dubay & Genevieve M. Kenney, Health Care Access and Use Among Low-Income 
Children: Who Fares Best?, HEALTH AFFAIRS 20:1, 112 (2001); Paul W. Newacheck, Jeffrey J. Stoddard, 
Dana Hughes, & Michelle Pearl, Health Insurance and Access to Primary Care for Children, 338 NEW 
ENG. J. MED No. 8, 513-19 (February 19, 1998); Paul W. Newacheck, Michelle Pearl, Dana Hughes, 
and Neal Halfon, 1998b.  The Role of  Medicaid in Ensuring Children’s Access to Care, JAMA 78:8 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 927-933; Alan C. Monheit & Peter J. Cunningham, Children Without Health Insurance, 2 
U.S. HEALTH CARE FOR CHILD No. 2, 154-170 (Winter 1992). 
27 Rosenbaum et al., supra note 21; Rosenbaum et. al., supra note 2. 
28 Id. 
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health care access and utilization for low prevalence conditions.29  At the same 
time, the relationship between coverage and access is sufficiently strong to suggest 
that the issue of  coverage, particularly for persons with limited means, must be 
understood well beyond the threshold question of  whether any coverage exists.30 
To that end, studies of  the intricacies of  coverage become the starting point for 
this type of  research. 
The first part of  this article lays out the context for our study by examining 
Medicaid and SCHIP in their legislative structure and detail.  Part Two presents the 
key findings from our research.  Part Three discusses the implications of  our findings 
for the future of  Medicaid for children. 
Bedfellows: Medicaid and SCHIP 
The starting point for this study is an overview of  Medicaid and SCHIP, 
existing side-by-side in the Social Security Act, but which in many respects are as 
different as the more famous Medicare/Medicaid duo. 
Medicaid 
Codified at Title XIX, Medicaid is the nation’s single largest source of  health 
insurance, covering some 51 million persons as of  2002 at a total cost of  more than 
$200 billion.31  Despite its more limited popularity than Medicare, Medicaid is in 
some respects the most extraordinary surviving statutory legacy of  the Great Society, 
enacted in 1965 as an “afterthought” to Medicare, and a “relegation” to states of  
responsibility for insuring the poor.32  Medicaid is the largest surviving public means- 
tested legal entitlement.  The Medicaid entitlement is three-fold.  First, the law 
entitles states to open-ended federal financial assistance for the cost of dozens of 
classes of  federally recognized health services furnished to eligible and enrolled 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Diane Rowland, House Commerce Committee, Challenges Facing the Medicaid Program in the 21st 
Century, (October 8, 2003) at http://www.kff.org/content/testimony/cfm (last visited September 
24, 2004). 
32 RASHI FEIN, MEDICAL CARE, MEDICAL COSTS: THE SEARCH FOR A HEALTH INSURANCE POLICY (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, MA) (1998). 
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persons by qualified and participating health care providers.  Second, the program 
entitles qualified providers to payment for furnishing covered services to enrolled 
persons, although the terms of  payment are left in most cases to state discretion.33 
Third, Medicaid entitles beneficiaries to a federally defined set of  “medical 
assistance” benefits and services which fall within the federal definition.  The federal 
definition of  what constitutes “medical assistance” is exceptionally broad, extending 
to routine, primary, acute, and long-term services.  Many forms of   “medical 
assistance” are mandatory while others are optional.  There is no particular logic to 
coverage mandates and options.  For example, “rural health clinic” services are 
mandatory while prescription drug coverage is optional.  In 2002, close to two- 
thirds of  all federal and state Medicaid expenditures were for services classified as 
“optional.”34 
Unlike Medicare, Medicaid contains no explicit provisions allowing 
beneficiaries to bring legal actions to enforce their federal legal entitlement.35  At 
the same time however, the courts have recognized the legal entitlement as 
individually enforceable since the program’s inception, despite serious erosion of  
enforcement rights in the case of  other Social Security Act benefits in recent years.36 
Medicaid has a special relationship to children.  Children comprise half  of  
all Medicaid enrollees; in 2002, the program financed one third of  all U.S. births 
and by 2003, covered 25% of  all children.37  Between 1980 and 2002, the proportion 
33 RAND ROSENBLATT, SLYVIA LAW, & SARA ROSENBAUM, LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
(Foundation Press, New York, NY, 1997); RAND ROSENBLATT, SARA ROSENBAUM & DAVID M. 
FRANKFORD, LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (Foundation Press, New York, NY) 
(1997 & Supp. 2002). 
34 Kaiser Commission, supra note 8. 
35 TIMOTHY S. JOST, DISENTITLEMENT? THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTH CARE PROGRAMS 
AND A RIGHT-BASED RESPONSE (Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 2003); Rosenblatt, et. al., 
supra note 33. 
36 Rosenblatt, Law & Rosenbaum, supra note 8; Jost, supra note 35; John Holahan, Alan Weil & 
Joshua M. Weiner, Which Way for Federalism and Health Policy? HEALTH AFFAIRS WEB EXCLUSIVE, July 
16, 2003, at http://www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/2205Holahan.pdf  (accessed October 
13, 2003); Weil, supra note 7; Rosenbaum, supra note 1. 
37 National Governor’s Association MCH Update 2002: State Health Coverage for Low-Income Pregnant 
Women, Children, and Parents (June 10, 2003) available at http://www.nga.org/cda/files/ 
MCHUPDATE02.pdf; Census Bureau, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage: 2003 (2004) 
available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2004/IncPov04slides1-3.pdf. 
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of  children covered by Medicaid more than doubled, from approximately 10 million 
to 25 million, as a result of  coverage expansions either mandated by Congress or 
adopted by states, sustained high levels of  childhood poverty, and the long-term 
erosion of  employment-based health insurance coverage for lower wage workers 
and their families.38 
Children eligible for Medicaid on a mandatory basis are those who live in 
families with countable family incomes at 133% of  the federal poverty level in the 
case of  infants and children under age 6 and 100% of  the federal poverty level for 
children ages 6-18.39  Children for whom Medicaid is mandatory are also those who 
receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits on the basis of  blindness or 
disability, and children in families whose categorical and financial characteristics 
leave them “related to” states’ 1996 eligibility standards for Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (which was repealed by the Welfare Reform Act of  1996).40 
The official poverty level figure is misleadingly low in the case of  children 
enrolled in Medicaid on the basis of  income.41  In Medicaid, as in other public 
welfare entitlements, financial eligibility is calculated on the basis of  “countable” 
or “net” income following the application of  numerous financial disregards and 
adjustments to household income required under law.  Work and shelter expenses 
qualify for certain deductions, certain family income - such as SSI benefits received 
by a sibling or a parent are disregarded, and a portion of  child support payments 
also is disregarded.42  In the case of  lower income children who live in large 
households with extended family members, only parental income, rather than total 
household income is counted.  As a result of  these financial adjustments (which in 
38 Peter J. Cunningham, Jack Hadley, & James D. Reschovsky, The Effects of  SCHIP on Children’s 
Health Insurance Coverage, MED. CARE RESEARCH & REVIEW 59:4, 359 (Dec. 2002). 
39 Schneider et al., supra note 6; Kaiser Commission, supra note 8; Cindy Mann, Diane Rowland, & 
Rachel Garfield, Historical Overview of  Children’s Health Care Coverage, 13 HEALTH INS. FOR CHILD. No. 
1, 36. 
40 Garfield et al., supra note 6. 
41 Sara Rosenbaum & Anne Markus, 2002 SCHIP Policy Brief  #4: State Eligibility Rules under 
Separate State SCHIP Programs-Implications for Children’s Access to Care (Geo. Washington 
Univ. Med. Ctr., Washington, DC) http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/downloads/SCHIP-_brief4.pdf. 
42 Id. 
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concept parallel the income adjustments in the Internal Revenue Code) children 
may qualify for Medicaid as poverty level recipients when in fact their incomes 
considerably surpass the federal poverty level.43 
Furthermore, Medicaid’s financial eligibility options where children and 
pregnant women are concerned are virtually limitless as a result of  a provision 
added to the program by the (subsequently repealed) Medicare Catastrophic 
Coverage Act of  1988.44  This provision (which survived repeal) permits states to 
extend Medicaid to any child through the use of  more generous income and asset 
“disregards” used to calculate financial eligibility for Medicaid.  For example, a 
state might double the shelter allowance and treble the earned income deduction, 
thereby counting as “poverty level” children, those whose families’ gross incomes 
actually reach or exceed twice the federal poverty level.  As of  1997, the year of  
SCHIP’s enactment, a few states had taken advantage of  this option either through 
the state plan amendment process or as part of  a broader Medicaid demonstration.45 
Most states however eschewed this option; indeed by 1997, Medicaid had undergone 
the “near death” experience of  being block granted as part of  the 1996 welfare 
reform legislation and states were in no mood to extend legal entitlements to millions 
of  children, particularly in a booming period of  economic recovery.46 
It is also worth noting that Medicaid eligibility can begin up to 3 months 
prior to the date of  application in cases in which the individual would have satisfied 
program eligibility standards had application occurred at an earlier point.47  This 
provision plays a particularly important role for both children and adults who may 
be uninsured at the time of  a major health event and whose application comes only 
after the fact.  The retroactivity aspect of  Medicaid underscores its role as a program 
which operates outside the norms of  conventional insurance, without pre-existing 
condition exclusions, waiting periods, or other barriers to enrollment essential to 
the proper functioning of a risk pool.48 
43 Id. 
44 §303(d) and §303(e) (5) of  Pub. L. 100-360.  The Act, which added prescription drug coverage 
to Medicare, was subsequently repealed, but this Medicaid provision survived. 
45 Mann et al., supra note 39, at 37. 
46 Rosenbaum & Sonosky, supra note 12, at 100. 
47 Schneider et al., supra note 6. 
48 Rosenbaum, supra note 1; Weil, supra note 7; Schneider et al., supra note 6. 
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Where children are concerned, Medicaid is particularly important, not only 
because of  its unusually generous eligibility standards, but also because of  its singular 
coverage rules.  Children’s Medicaid legal entitlement to coverage encompasses an 
extraordinary range and depth of  benefits and services, and the rules of  coverage 
are found nowhere else in insurance law.  These rules survive even when children 
are enrolled in managed care systems which furnish less than all covered benefits, 
because they are part of  the federal legal entitlement to coverage itself.49  As a 
result of  legislative amendments enacted in 1967, revised in 1981 and again in 
1989,50 Medicaid coverage requirements extend far beyond the standards applicable 
to adults.  With the exception of  the small number of  “medically needy” children 
who “spend down” to eligibility by incurring high health care costs, all Medicaid 
enrolled children under age 21 are entitled to Early and Periodic Screening Diagnostic 
and Treatment (EPSDT) services.51  These services consist of  comprehensive 
periodic and “as needed” health exams to identify physical, mental, and 
developmental conditions, complete vision, dental and hearing care, all 
immunizations recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization 
Practices (an advisory body to the CDC), and all medically necessary diagnoses and 
treatments, which fall within the federal definition of  “medical assistance,” 
determined to be necessary to treat or “ameliorate” children’s physical and mental 
health conditions disclosed through screens.52  Thus, while many forms of  medical 
assistance are optional for adults, all benefits and services falling within the federal 
definition of  medical assistance are mandatory for children. (See Figure 1 pg. 12). 
49 Rosenblatt, Law & Rosenbaum, supra note 33, at 110. 
50 42 U.S.C.A. §19 (2004). 
51 Sara Rosenbaum et al., Room to Grow: Promoting Child Development through Medicaid and SCHIP 
(Commonwealth Fund, NY, NY) at http://www.cmwf.org/programs/child/ 
rosenbaum_room_451.pdf  (June 2001); Rosenbaum, et. al., supra note 21. 
52 Sara Rosenbaum, Michelle Proser, Andy Schneider & Colleen Sonosky, Room to Grow: Promoting 
Child Development through Medicaid and SCHIP (Commonwealth Fund, NY, NY) at http:// 
www.cmwf.org/programs/child/rosenbaum_room_451.pdf  (June 2001); Rosenbaum, et. al., supra 
note 21. 
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Figure 1.  The EPSDT Benefit53 
1. PERIODIC AND “AS NEEDED” SCREENING SERVICES 
THAT INCLUDE: 
·  An unclothed physical examination 
· Comprehensive health and developmental history (including 
assessment of  both physical and mental health development) 
·  Immunizations recommended by the CDC Advisory Committee 
on immunization practices 
·  Laboratory tests (including blood lead level assessment appropriate 
for age and risk factors) 
·  Health education 
2. VISION SERVICES (ASSESSMENT, DIAGNOSIS AND 
TREATMENT INCLUDING EYEGLASSES) 
3. HEARING SERVICES (ASSESSMENT, DIAGNOSIS AND 
TREATMENT INCLUDING HEARING AIDS) 
4. DENTAL SERVICES WHICH INCLUDE AT A MINIMUM 
RELIEF OF PAIN AND INFECTIONS, RESTORATION OF 
TEETH AND MAINTENANCE OF DENTAL HEALTH 
5. SUCH NECESSARY HEALTH CARE, DIAGNOSTIC SERVICES, 
TREATMENT AND OTHER MEASURES CLASSIFIED AS 
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO CORRECT OR AMELIORATE 
DEFECTS AND PHYSICAL AND MENTAL HEALTH 
CONDITIONS DISCOVERED BY SCREENING SERVICES, 
WHETHER OR NOT SUCH SERVICES ARE COVERED UNDER 
THE STATE MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PLAN. 
6. A “PREVENTIVE” STANDARD OF MEDICAL NECESSITY, 
RECOGNIZED IN AGENCY IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES 
AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
53 §1905(r) of  the Soc.Sec.Act, 42 U.S.C. §1396d(r); Part 5, Section 5122 of  the State Medicaid 
Manual, available at: http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/pub45/pub_45.asp. 
13 
In some respects, the rules of  coverage where children are concerned are 
even more notable than the broad classes of  coverage themselves.  Federal law 
prohibits application to children under 18 of  even nominal co-payments for covered 
benefits and services.54  Even more dramatic is the framework applicable to medical 
necessity determinations under the program.  Medicaid does not explicitly define 
medical necessity for any covered population, including children, requiring instead 
that state definitions be reasonable, consistent with the program’s overall purposes, 
and not discriminate in the provision of  mandated services against particular 
conditions or illnesses.55  Where children are concerned, the federal legal principles 
of  reasonableness applicable to state coverage standards, as construed under a nearly 
40 year-old judicial and administrative interpretive “gloss,” coupled with the terms 
“early” and “ameliorate” in the EPSDT statute itself, and the program’s fabled 
legislative history,56 underscore the preventive nature of  the EPSDT legal entitlement 
and reject arbitrary limits on coverage (such as fixed day, treatment or dollar limits) 
unrelated to the medical need for treatment.57  These judicial rulings and agency 
interpretations were powerfully reinforced by the 1989 EPSDT legislative 
amendments, which broadly expanded the diagnosis and treatment mandate to 
include all forms of  medical assistance, added mandatory coverage for “as needed” 
examinations, and tied the concept of  medical necessity to the recommendations 
of  treating health professionals.58  While the 1984 regulations have never been 
updated to reflect the amendments (a sure sign of  the program’s controversial 
54 Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 1; Schneider et al., supra note 6. 
55 42 C.F.R. §440.230(b0, 42 C.F.R. §440.230(c).  For a discussion of  the special Medicaid principles 
that govern coverage of  children, see Sara Rosenbaum & Colleen Sonosky, Federal EPSDT Coverage 
Policy: An Analysis of  State Medicaid Plans and State Medicaid Managed Care Contracts (2002) at http:// 
www.gwhealthpolicy.org/medicaid_publications_epsdt.htm. 
56 More specifically, the statute was modified in response to two seminal pieces of  health services 
research, which examined the diminished health status of  the first young children enrolled in Head 
Start, as well as the very serious disabling conditions affecting low-income young adults rejected 
for Selective Service.  EPSDT Does it Spell Health Care for Poor Children (Children’s Defense Fund, 
Washington, D.C.); ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA (Free 
Press, New York, NY 1974); Better Health for Our Children: A National Strategy, Select Panel for the 
Promotion of  Child Health (Public Health Service, Department of  Health and Human Services, 
Washington D.C. 1981); A.M. FOLTZ, AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION: CHILD HEALTH POLITICS UNDER 
MEDICAID (MIT Press, 1982);  Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 1; Rosenblatt & Rosenbaum, 
supra note 33. 
57 Sara Rosenbaum & David Rousseau, Medicaid at Thirty Five, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7, 7-51 (2001); 
Sara Rosenbaum Health Policy Report: Medicaid, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 8, 635-640 (2002). 
58 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of  1989 (OBRA 89) Pub. L. 101-239. 
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nature), the most recent federal guidelines reinforce its scope and reach.59  As a 
result, diagnosis and treatment must be furnished at the earliest possible point in 
the progression of  a condition, and the recommendations of  treating clinicians are 
considered to carry especially great weight.60 
In sum, both historically and legally, the term “medical necessity” in a 
Medicaid child health context is grounded in concepts of  early intervention to 
ameliorate physical and health conditions, and is a bar against arbitrary limits on 
diagnosis and treatment unrelated to the recommendations of  treating conditions.61 
Furthermore, when read in the context of  Medicaid’s general prohibition against 
discrimination in the provision of  mandatory treatments and services based on an 
individual’s diagnosis or condition, these special coverage rules result in a form of  
third party financing which, simply stated, has no counterpart in the commercial 
insurance market.62  For Medicaid enrolled children, virtually any form of  health 
care is covered from the time that its clinical need is first suspected; treatments 
range from medical interventions necessary to diagnose and treat conditions to 
clinically recommended preventive therapies furnished by “licensed practitioners 
of  the healing arts.”63  Covered treatments must be furnished without the types of  
“macro” exclusions and limitations which tend to characterize the commercial 
market.64  As a result, Medicaid treatments for children encompass not only treatment 
necessary for “recovery” or “improvement” from “illness or injury” but also 
treatments necessary to avoid or ameliorate the long-term effects of  chronic illness 
and disability from which there may never be recovery or improvement in the 
narrow sense of  the terms.65  In the case of  Medicaid coverage for children, there 
is no need to show that a recommended treatment will allow a child to “recover 
normal functioning” following an “illness or  injury” as there typically would be in 
the case of  commercial insurance.66  Nor does Medicaid contain the typical pediatric 
59 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, State Medicaid Manual (2004), available at http:// 
www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/pub45/pub_45asp. 
60 Sara Rosenbaum & Colleen Sonosky, Federal EPSDT Coverage Policy: An Analysis of  State Medicaid 
Plans and State Medicaid Managed Care Contracts, Chapter 1, p. 2, at http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/ 
medicaid_publications_epsdt.htm; Rosenbaum et. al., supra note 21, at 3. 
61 Id at 7. 
62 42 U.S.C. §1396(a)(17); 42 C.F.R. §440.230. 
63 Medicaid Manual, supra note 59. 
64 Rosenbaum, supra note 1, at 636. 
65 Id.; Rosenbaum & Sonosky, supra note 60, at 2. 
66 Rosenbaum, supra note 64. 
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exclusions found in commercial plans, such as “educational” exclusions; indeed, 
Medicaid specifically mandates coverage of  all otherwise covered items and services 
listed in special educational or early intervention plans developed for children with 
disabilities under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).67 
To be sure, an expanded notion of  coverage is one of  Medicaid’s most 
essential attributes for adults as well, which accounts for the fact that more than 
two-thirds of  all Medicaid expenditures are for the elderly and persons with severe 
disabilities.68  But in the case of  adults, much of  this coverage is optional with state 
programs, whereas it is required for children.69  Indeed, so broad is Medicaid coverage 
for children that although its coverage is classified as “insurance” for purposes of  
statistical population coverage estimates, its “legal operating system” follows 
absolutely none of  the conventions of  insurance, particularly where children are 
concerned.70  Medicaid in a child health context is best thought of  as a legal 
entitlement among eligible children to comprehensive health care financing. 
It should come as no surprise that the EPSDT program – and the 1989 
EPSDT amendments in particular, which radically expanded the rules of  coverage 
– have proven to be politically unpopular.71  States have repeatedly called for 
relaxation of  federal standards, and EPSDT requirements have consistently ranked 
at the top of  lists compiled by Governors and state legislators when asked to identify 
unreasonable Medicaid standards.72  When asked to explain the opposition, state 
Medicaid officials point to examples of what they consider to be wildly unreasonable 
service requests, such as dance therapy for children with disabilities or horseback 
riding therapy.  There exists, however, no systematic evidence of  the extent to 
which non-traditional therapeutic services aimed at improving emotional and physical 
health dominate EPSDT spending; indeed, federal expenditure data underscore 
67 20 U.S.C. §1400 et. seq. 
68 Kaiser Commission supra note 8; Rosenbaum, supra note 64, at 637. 
69 Rosenbaum, supra note 64, at 637; Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 1; Schneider et. al., supra 
note 6. 
70 Deborah Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of  Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. (2):287- 
317 (Summer 1993). 
71 Rosenbaum & Sonosky, supra note 12, at 85-86. 
72 Id. at 86; National Governor’s Association, supra note 8. 
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the extent to which spending on children is for entirely traditional forms of  medical 
care such as physician and hospital services, prescription drugs, medical equipment, 
and diagnostic services.73 
SCHIP 
SCHIP is a grant-in-aid statute which entitles participating states to an annual 
aggregate payment toward the cost of  “child health assistance” furnished by 
participating providers to enrolled children.74  Unlike Medicaid which is perpetual, 
SCHIP was authorized for a 10-year term.75 
In popular lore, SCHIP had its genesis in the desire of  Congress and the 
President to find common ground following the failure of  national health reform.76 
In the wake of  the 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA), which provided for greater “portability” of  employee health benefits, 
SCHIP was presented as a bipartisan consensus regarding the appropriate role of  
the federal government in subsidizing health care for lower income uninsured 
children without access to Medicaid.77  The legislation received heavy support from 
traditional children’s advocacy groups.78 
The reality regarding SCHIP’s origins is far more complicated.  In its policy 
aims, the legislation may have had roots in expansive concepts.  In its statutory 
structure however, SCHIP was the child of  the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of  1996 (welfare reform).79  Until the threat of  a 
Presidential veto resulted in its removal, the 1996 legislation contained a successor 
program to Medicaid, which would have replaced the law with an aggregate, capped 
federal grant-in-aid program which entitled states to assistance but removed the 
individual legal entitlement as well as virtually all coverage, payment, and detailed 
73 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2003 Data Compendium, available at http:// 
www.cms.hhs.gov/researchers/pubs/datacompendium/current. 
74 Rosenbaum et al., supra note 2; Sara Rosenbaum et al., “The Children’s Hour: The State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program,” 17 HEALTH AFF. 1:75-89, 76 (January-February, 1989). 
75 Id. 
76 Rosenbaum & Sonosky, supra note 12, at 86-87. 
77 Id. 
78 Rosenbaum & Sonosky, supra note 12, at 82, 94-96. 
79 Id. at 91. 
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80 Id. 
81 Rosenbaum et al., supra note 2; Sara Rosenbaum et al., “The Children’s Hour: The State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program,” 17 HEALTH AFF. 1:75-89, 76 (January-February, 1989). 
82 Rosenbaum, et. al., supra note 81. 
83 Title XXI of  the Social Security Act, §2101 [hereinafter Title XXI]; 42 U.S.C. 1397aa. 
84 R. Andrew Allison & Robert  F. St. Peter, Children’s Enrollment in HealthWave and Medicaid: Where 
Do We Stand? Kansas HealthWave Evaluation Project (2001), available at http://www.khi.org/ 
transfers/IssueBrieff12.AA1.pdf; R. Andrew Allison, Barbara LaClair & Robert  F. St. Peter, Children’s 
Enrollment in Kansas Public Health Insurance Programs Since the Introduction of  HealthWave, Kansas 
HealthWave Evaluation Project (2001b), at http://www.khi.org/transfers/Issuebrieff2001.pdf. 
85 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of  1989 (OBRA) Pub. L. 101-239. 
administration requirements.80  These characteristics also constitute a near-perfect 
description of  the SCHIP statutory structure.81 
Even more strikingly, SCHIP does not merely permit states to augment 
Medicaid coverage: it allows them to use SCHIP as an alternative to Medicaid 
coverage.82  That is, states can either combine approaches or choose either to operate 
SCHIP as a separate program or to allocate their payments toward Medicaid 
expansions.83  The children covered under a state’s separate SCHIP would be 
Medicaid-ineligible children with family incomes at or below 200% of  the federal 
poverty level, or at a slightly higher eligibility level in states which had generous 
Medicaid programs already reaching SCHIP’s 200% threshold.84  Children with 
incomes exceeding the SCHIP upper limit could qualify for Medicaid either as 
medically needy or through the use of  the special 1989 legislative authority to extend 
coverage to all children who might require Medicaid as either a primary or 
supplemental insurer.85  The bottom line is that states could effectively substitute 
SCHIP for Medicaid in the case of  uninsured children with incomes above 
mandatory Medicaid eligibility levels.  (See figure 2 pg. 19). 
On the face of  it then, SCHIP would seem like a particularly loopy legislative 
initiative.  Why would Congress, which hardly can be said to spend excessively on 
public welfare programs for low-income families, allocate $40 billion in scarce federal 
resources over a 10 year time period (the SCHIP price tag) for a program which 
appears to be utterly duplicative of  what Medicaid already permits where children 
are concerned?  The answer, of  course, lays in SCHIP’s coverage design rules.  It is 
true that SCHIP also provides for a more generous federal subsidy than the level 
allowed states under Medicaid; but when Senators Rockefeller and Chafee attempted 
to offer an amendment during the 1997 Senate Finance Committee’s consideration 
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of  the legislation to increase federal matching rates for certain optional children in 
lieu of  establishing a new program, their proposal was rejected in the face of  
opposition by other Members of  the Committee and the Governor’s Association.86 
It is in the area of  coverage design where SCHIP’s “not-Medicaid” character and 
strength (at least from a state perspective) can be seen.87 
SCHIP departs utterly from Medicaid in virtually every key respect where 
coverage is concerned.  First, the legislation expressly eliminates the individual legal 
entitlement which lies at the heart of  Medicaid, while simultaneously creating a 
legal entitlement to allotments in participating states.88  Second, SCHIP replaces 
Medicaid’s defined benefit medical assistance structure with a “premium support” 
model using the “basic services” covered in the law’s actuarial benchmarks to calibrate 
the coverage obligations of  approved state plans.89  The SCHIP “benchmarks” 
from which states can choose are the Federal Employee Health Benefit Plan, the 
health benefit plan offered state employees in a participating state, or the best selling 
HMO product in the state.90   In other words, the “child health assistance” extended 
to eligible children under SCHIP consists of  subsidization of  enrollment into a 
participating plan offering “benchmark” coverage.91  Thus, coverage, as 
conceptualized in SCHIP, was a direct legislative precursor to the premium support 
approach to coverage of  prescription drug benefits, which was taken in the 2003 
Medicare legislation; unlike the Medicare legislation however, SCHIP specifies no 
statutory standards for participating plans, although implementing federal regulations 
do contain certain enrollment and other safeguards.92 
While the SCHIP statute enumerates benefits which in their terms parallel 
the Medicaid definition of  “medical assistance,” this enumeration identifies what 
states may spend money on, not what they must cover.93 For all practical purposes, 
87 Id. at 87. 
88 Title XXI, §2101 (c); 42 U.S. C. 1397aa (c); Policy Brief, supra note 3; Rosenbaum et al., supra note 
2. 
89 Rosenbaum et al., supra note 21, at 7-8; Rosenbaum et al., supra note 2. 
90 Title XXI, §2103 (b); 42 U.S.C. 1397cc (b). 
91 Rosenbaum et al., supra note 21, at 7-8; Rosenbaum et al., supra note 2. 
92 42 CFR Parts 457 et. seq. 




Children whose coverage is optional
under either Medicaid or SCHIP
Children whose coverage is optional
under Medicaid
(1)Under Medicaid, mandatory groups are children ages 0-6 under 133%FPL and children ages 6-19 under 100%FPL.
(2)Targeted children under SCHIP are children with incomes between the upper Medicaid eligibility level in the state
and 200%FPL (with some exceptions in states with Medicaid eligibility levels already above 200%FPL where SCHIP
eligibility can be extended up to 50 percentage points over the maximum Medicaid level).  This means that the SCHIP
population represented by the middle circle shrinks and grows depending on Medicaid policy in the state.  These





Figure 2.  SCHIP as a Coverage Alternative to Medicaid 
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the only standard which counts is the actuarial “basic benefit” benchmark; if  a state 
selects a benchmark which includes “additional” services other than those considered 
“basic,” then it must offer those services at a “substantial actuarial value.”94  The 
SCHIP statute contains no rules of  coverage other than a bar against the imposition 
of  pre-existing condition exclusions.95  Basic benefits consist of  “inpatient and 
outpatient hospital services, physicians’ surgical and medical services, laboratory 
and x-ray services, well-baby and well-child care (as defined by the state), and age 
appropriate immunizations.”96  “Additional” service “categories” consist of  
“prescription drugs, mental health services, vision services, and hearing services.”97 
Within the categories of  “basic” and “additional” service, no standards 
exist with respect to tests of  reasonableness, definitions of  benefits, medical necessity 
standards, or non-discrimination in coverage.98 The law does prohibit the imposition 
of  pre-existing condition exclusions and specifies the applicability of  HIPAA 
portability and mental health parity standards.99  Implementing regulations 
interpreted these provisions slightly more explicitly (for example, the rules define 
the term “age appropriate immunizations” to cover all ACIP-approved vaccines 
and specify coverage of  “emergency” care).100  But for all practical purposes, the 
rules adhere to the vagaries of  the statute, leaving states and their plan contractors 
with immense discretion over benefit design. 
A clear example of  the discretion enjoyed by states can be seen in the 
definition of  an EPSDT examination compared to a SCHIP well-baby exam.  The 
Medicaid statute defines an EPSDT “periodic screen” as an assessment which 
94 Id. 
95 Title XXI, §2103 (f) (1); 42 U.S.C. 1397cc (f) (1). 
96 Title XXI, §2103 (c); 42 U.S.C. 1397cc (c); Rosenbaum et al., supra note 21. 
97 Id. 
98 Rosenbaum et al., supra note 21, at 8. 
99 Title XXI, supra note 93. 
100 42 CFR Parts 457.520 (b)(4) and 457.10. 
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encompasses specified procedures: a health history, an unclothed physical 
examination, an assessment of  growth and development, appropriate laboratory 
tests (including tests for elevated blood lead exposure), ACIP-required 
immunizations, assessments of  vision and hearing in accordance with professional 
standards, and a referral to a dentist for preventive, restorative and emergency 
treatment.101  The SCHIP statute, in contrast, contains no specifications regarding 
well-baby or well-child exams, and implementing regulations clarify that the content 
is defined by a state.102 
It is also important to note that unlike Medicaid, SCHIP cannot supplement 
inadequate coverage; the statute’s health insurance “anti-crowd-out” provisions 
explicitly prohibit its use to enhance existing coverage.103 
In sum, as Figure 3 shows, SCHIP is a variation on a state block grant, not 
a public legal entitlement.  The statute was deliberately structured to operate as a 
substitute for Medicaid expansions into the near-poor child population, a vastly more 
palatable approach from a state policy perspective.104 SCHIP creates a legal 
entitlement (albeit capped) in states but bars comparable treatment of  children.105 
The statute uses a premium support approach to coverage, eliminates virtually all 
coverage design requirements applicable to children, not only in terms of  classes 
of  benefits and services but equally as importantly, in terms of  the rules of  coverage 
themselves.106  In addition, the statute permits premiums and patient cost sharing.107 
(See Figure 3 pg. 22-23). 
101 Title XXI, §1905(r); 42 U.S.C. §1396d(r). 
102 Title XXI, §2110 (a); 42 U.S.C. §1397jj(a); 42 CFR Parts 457.10. 
103 Title XXI, §2110 (b) (1)(c); 42 U.S.C. §1397jj (b)(1)(c); Cunningham, et. al., supra note 38. 
104 Rosenbaum et al., supra note 12, at 90. 
105 Title XXI, §2101(c), §2102(b)(4); 42 U.S.C. §1397aa (c), §1397bb(b)(4). 
106 Title XXI, §2103(a-d); 42 U.S.C. §1397cc(a-d); Rosenbaum, et. al., supra note 21, at 7-8. 
107 Title XXI, §2103(e); 42 U.S.C. §1397cc(e). 
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Participating states must entitle eligible 
children to a broad range of  required 
classes of “medical assistance”. 
Required coverage for children is 
federally defined and nationally uniform 
in scope: 
• The EPSDT benefit encompasses 
detailed statutory assessment 
procedures, vision, dental and 
hearing services, and all forms of  
treatment that fall within the 
federal definition of “medical 
assistance.” 
• No distinctions are drawn between 
physical and mental conditions. 
Participating states must furnish “child 
health assistance,” which is subject to 
certain basic design rules but is not a legal 
entitlement in eligible children.  States’ 
coverage design flexibility is subject to 
certain rules: 
• Coverage must be “equivalent 
to,” and must have an 
“aggregate actuarial value that 
is at least actuarially equivalent” 
to, a  “benchmark benefit 
package”  selected by the state. 
• Required categories of  “basic 
services” must be included in 
the benchmark (inpatient and 
outpatient hospital care, 
physician surgical and medical 
services, laboratory and x-ray 
services,  “well baby and well 
child” care (undefined) and  age 
appropriate  immunizations. 
• States have the option of  
covering prescription drugs, 
mental health services, vision 
services, hearing services, and 
other services recognized as 
“child health assistance.” 
Figure 3. A Broad Comparison of  Benefit Design Requirements 
Under Medicaid and SCHIP 
MEDICAID SCHIP 
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There is no federal definition of  medical 
necessity, tests of  reasonableness, or 
non-discrimination in coverage 
provisions.  HIPAA prohibitions against 
preexisting condition exclusions apply to 
insurance products however. 
The concept of  medical necessity is 
subject to federal rules. States must use 
a “preventive” standard of  medical 
necessity in accordance with the benefit 
and federal standards of reasonableness 
and prohibitions against discrimination 
on the basis of  condition or illness. 
MEDICAID SCHIP 
Cost-sharing is prohibited for all 
categorically needy children. 
Cost-sharing is permitted subject to 
certain limits but is prohibited for well 
baby and well child care including 
immunizations. 
Children are legally entitled to a defined 
group of  benefits. States remain directly 
obligated to cover all benefits that exceed 
limits of  MCO contracts. 
Benefits are not a federal legal 
entitlement. States are not obligated to 
furnish defined benefits beyond the 
benchmark. 
Figure 3. A Broad Comparison of  Benefit Design Requirements 
Under Medicaid and SCHIP  (continued) 
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 In terms of  the proportion of  children receiving any level of  publicly 
supported health care financing assistance, the SCHIP approach definitely has 
worked; indeed, the program’s impact was immediate.108  Whereas states’ response 
to the 1988 Medicaid option to reach all children in need of  health insurance could 
be described as lethargic at best, within 3 years, all states had implemented at least 
some level of  expanded coverage under SCHIP.109  Figure 4 shows states’ 
implementation choices and 2002 eligibility levels. Figure 4 clusters states into three 
separate tiers. At the top are the 15 states and the District of  Columbia that invested 
their SCHIP allotments solely into Medicaid expansions. The middle tier shows 
states that implemented SCHIP as a hybrid, expanding Medicaid somewhat and 
filling in the rest with a separately-administered program at somewhat higher income 
levels, in an attempt to balance the two main issues of  entitling the poorest children 
and smoothing out the age bands (so that older poor children would be equitably 
treated compared to younger poor children) on the one hand, and providing less 
generous treatment for the near poor, on the other hand.  The third tier shows 
states that used their allotments solely to establish a separately-administered program; 
this tier includes Pennsylvania, one of  three states with Florida and New York, 
whose separate children’s insurance programs was already in place at the time of  
SCHIP’s enactment and was grandfathered into the new law by statute.  (See Figure 
4 pg. 25). 
There have been no published studies on the politics of  state 
implementation, but the wealth of  contemporary publicity, meetings, and anecdotal 
evidence that have accompanied implementation suggest that two related factors 
have tended to influence which tier a state ultimately fell into.   The first factor was 
the issue of  legal entitlements.  State officials reported that the ability to avoid an 
entitlement and the relatively uncontrollable expenditure vulnerability that goes 
along with it heavily influenced their decisions regarding whether to implement 
SCHIP fully or partially as a separate program.110  In fact, no state that established 
a separate SCHIP program did so as a state legal entitlement.111  It is therefore 
ironic, perhaps, that implementation of  SCHIP was accompanied by an explosion 
108 Debbie Chang & Genevieve Kenney, The State Children’s Health Insurance Program: Successes, 
Shortcomings, and Challenges 23:5 HEALTH AFFAIRS 51-62 (2004). 
109 Id. 
110 Chang & Kenney, op. cit., supra note 108, at p. 52. 
111 Policy Brief, supra note 3, at 1. 
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MEDICAID EXPANSION ONLY 
Alaska (200%FPL), Arkansas (200%FPL), District of Columbia (200%FPL), 
Hawaii (200%FPL), Idaho (150%FPL), Louisiana (200%FPL), Minnesota 
(280%FPL, ages  0-2), Missouri (300%FPL), Nebraska (185%FPL), New 
Mexico (235%FPL), Ohio  (200%FPL), Oklahoma (185%FPL), Rhode 
Island (250% FPL), South Carolina (150%FPL, ages 1-18), Tennessee 
(200%FPL), Wisconsin (200%FPL) 
MEDICAID EXPANSION AND SEPARATELY-ADMINISTERED 
SCHIP PLAN 
Alabama (200%FPL), California (250%FPL), Connecticut (300%FPL), 
Florida (200%FPL, ages 1-18), Illinois (185%FPL), Indiana (200%FPL), 
Iowa (200%FPL),  Kentucky (200%FPL), Maine (200%FPL), Maryland 
(300%FPL), Massachusetts (200%FPL, ages 1-18), Michigan (200%FPL), 
Mississippi (200%FPL), New Hampshire (300%FPL, ages 1-18), New Jersey 
(350%FPL), New York (250%FPL), North Dakota (140%FPL), South 
Dakota (200%FPL), Texas (200%FPL), Virginia (200%FPL) 
SEPARATELY-ADMINISTERED SCHIP PLAN ONLY 
Arizona (200%FPL), Colorado (185%FPL), Delaware (200%FPL), Georgia 
(235%FPL), Kansas (200%FPL), Montana (150%FPL), Nevada (200%FPL), 
North Carolina (200%FPL), Oregon (170%FPL), Pennsylvania (235%FPL), 
Utah (200%FPL), Vermont (300%FPL), Washington (250%FPL), Wyoming 
(133%FPL), West Virginia (200%FPL) 
Figure 4. State Implementation Choices and 
Eligibility Levels under SCHIP 
(2002 Upper SCHIP Income Eligibility Limit) 
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of  children’s enrollment into Medicaid, even in states that administered SCHIP as 
a separate program.112 The cause of  this rapid run-up in children’s Medicaid 
enrollment was that many - and in some states most - of  the children identified 
through aggressive outreach were poor enough to be enrolled in Medicaid and 
therefore barred by federal law in enrollment into SCHIP, since SCHIP is limited 
to children who are ineligible for other forms of  coverage113 
The second issue frequently reported by state officials was the politics of  
Medicaid’s coverage design for children.  Numerous officials suggested strong 
political objections to such broad coverage for near-poor children in terms of  both 
the comprehensiveness of  benefits and the prohibitions against cost-sharing.114   One 
study for the United States Department of  Health and Human Services that was 
published in the early years of  implementation suggested that while states with 
separately-administered programs were pursuing cost-sharing, the actual level of  
cost-sharing requirements imposed was well below the level permitted under federal 
law.115   At the same time, the ability to impose cost-sharing (in particular, premiums 
at higher levels of  family income, a practice pursued by 29 states as of  2000) was 
viewed as politically important. 116 
112 Chang & Kenney, op. cit. supra, at p. 55. 
113 42 U.S.C. §1397jj(b)(1)(C); 42 CFR §457.310(b)(2); Rosenbaum & Markus, supra note 41, at 6. 
114 Office of  the Secretary Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Interim Evaluation Report: 
Congressionally Mandated Evaluation of  the State Children’s Health Insurance Program. Pg. XV.  February 
26, 2003 Executive Summary at http://www.aspe.os.dhhs.gov/health/schip/interimrpt/Interim.pdf  
115 Sara Rosenbaum, Anne Markus & Dylan Roby, An Analysis of  Implementation Issues Relating to 
CHIP Cost-Sharing Provisions for Certain Targeted Low Income Children, Health Resources and Services 
Administration and the Health Care Financing Administration, Department of  Health and Human 
Services, Baltimore and Bethesda, MD, at http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/downloads/ 
cs_finalreport_edt.pdf   (June 1999); Anne Markus, Sara Rosenbaum & Dylan Roby, Center For 
Health Policy, George Washington University, CHIP, Health Insurance Premiums and Cost-Sharing: 
Lessons from the Literature (October 1998)at http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/downloads/ 
cost_sharing_litreview_overview.pdf. 
116 Office of  the Secretary, supra note 114; National Conference of  State Legislatures (2000) State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP): Cost Sharing at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/ 
health/chipcost.htm. 
27 
117 Rosenbaum & Smith, supra note 3; Rosenbaum et al., supra note 2; Rosenbaum et al., supra note 
21; Rosenbaum et al., supra note 3; Rosenbaum & Markus, supra note 41. 
118 Rosenbaum et al., supra note 3, at 3-5; Office of  the Secretary, supra note 114; Sara Rosenbaum, 
Colleen Sonosky, Karen Shaw & Marcie Zakheim, Negotiating the New Health System: A Nationwide 
Study of  Medicaid Managed Care Contracts (K. Johnson ed., Center for Health Services Research and 
Policy, The George Washington University Medical Center, Washington, DC) (1 ed. 1997) [hereinafter 
1997 Nationwide Study] at http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/managed_care.htm. 
Findings from the SCHIP Design Studies 
 Given the potential importance of  benefit design flexibility accorded under 
the SCHIP statute, as well as its potential to allow states broad latitude in benefit 
design, a group of  researchers at George Washington University (GWU) with 
extensive experience in health insurance generally, and children’s insurance coverage 
under Medicaid in particular, carried out a series of  detailed descriptive studies 
over the 1998-2002 time period which collectively sought to measure variations in 
Medicaid and SCHIP design.117 
Study methods 
The study we report on here is a nationwide, point-in-time descriptive study of  
coverage under Medicaid and SCHIP, which considers both the coverage offered 
under states’ Medicaid and separately administered SCHIP plans, as well as the 
coverage which is available through managed care contracts covering children eligible 
for assistance. Both Medicaid and SCHIP agencies effectuate coverage either wholly 
or partially through the compulsory enrollment of  children in purchased managed 
care arrangements.118 As a result, children may derive coverage from two sources: 
the state plans for the program in which they are enrolled; and their managed care 
contracts.   For this reason, the studies had to be conducted in two phases.  In the 
first phase, researchers compared the details of  coverage under state Medicaid and 
SCHIP plans, as reported by participating Medicaid and SCHIP agencies to the 
federal government.  Such comparisons were once relatively easy, but for more 
than a decade the federal government has maintained no centralized repository of  
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detailed state plan information. For this reason, the task of  determining what, 
precisely, participating states cover under Medicaid and SCHIP has become a major 
chore.  Our previous research has reported on critical differences in SCHIP and 
Medicaid state plans, the most important of  which are silence in SCHIP plans on 
the definition of  medical necessity, as well as more limited coverage of  chronic 
care services, dental and mental health coverage.119 
In the second phase of  the study, managed care contracts had to be collected 
and analyzed in order to compare their scope of  coverage to the coverage offered 
under their respective state plans.  This step was important for two reasons. First, 
states’ Medicaid and SCHIP contracts actually may go beyond the state plan in 
their coverage specifications.  That is, a state plan may not identify certain services 
as covered for federal reporting purposes but nonetheless, the service is contractually 
specified. 
Second, in a study of  trends in public insurance design, understanding which 
benefits are included in the managed care contract and which remain as a direct 
financial and performance obligation of  a state agency, helps shed light on the 
practical and political limits of  the “marketization” of  public insurance. The close 
study of  contracts written by Medicaid agencies reveals certain definite patterns 
regarding which benefits are regarded as financially or administratively and medically 
manageable in the private sector.120  For example, Medicaid contracts routinely 
exempt certain classes of  benefits (e.g., intermediate care facilities for persons with 
mental retardation and home health services).121  Similarly, some of  the benefits 
covered in a Medicaid managed care contract may be subject to specified limits that 
do not apply under the state plan. For example, a contract may place a limit on 
psychiatric care of  26 mental health visits annually, but under EPSDT and  Medicaid’s 
general anti-discrimination rules, no such limit could be imposed by the state; that 
is, the contractual benefit would have to be supplemented by direct state payments 
were a child to need additional services. 
119 Rosenbaum et al., supra note 21. 
120 Sara Rosenbaum et al., Center for Health Service Research and Policy, Negotiating the New Health 
System: A Nationwide Study of  Medicaid Managed Care Contracts, (June 1999) [hereinafter 1999 Nationwide 
Study], at http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/managed_care.htm (last visited September 2004); 1997 
Nationwide Study, supra note 118. 
121 Id. 
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Similarly, some but not all prescription drugs covered under a state Medicaid 
plan might be included in its managed care contracts, with the remaining drugs in 
the state formulary covered under the state plan as a form of  supplemental coverage. 
Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in managed care effectively would be dually insured.122 
Most interestingly perhaps, public contracts might be silent with respect to 
certain critical definitional matters which undergird Medicaid benefits but that tend 
to have no counterpart in privately sold managed care products.123  Two prime 
examples are the medical necessity standard or explicit prohibitions against arbitrarily 
limiting covered benefits based on an enrollee’s condition.  In the absence of  explicit 
state policy (typically embodied in detailed contractual specifications), silence in 
the contract would leave contractors with considerable discretion that state Medicaid 
agencies themselves would not enjoy.124  Once again, Medicaid agencies would be 
in the position of  supplementing contractual services; non-contractual services 
would be covered on an extra-contractual basis.125  (At the same time of  course, 
unless and until a beneficiary or her provider pursues a claim for residual benefits, 
which necessitates a high degree of  knowledge and sophistication about the inner 
workings of  Medicaid, a state presumably would be able to curb their financial 
exposure for this penumbra of  supplemental coverage surrounding the contractual 
obligation.) 
A classic and easy example of  this coverage penumbra flowing from this 
residual benefit phenomenon (which includes non-contractual benefits as well as 
additional benefits flowing from EPSDT’s very liberal definition of  medical 
necessity) can be seen in the case of  physical therapy for adults recovering from 
stroke and a child with a developmental disability emanating from cerebral palsy.  A 
managed care contract which is silent on medical necessity would permit the 
contractor to use a traditional insurance definition of  medical necessity, which limits 
coverage to covered diagnostic and treatment services which either restore or 
improve functioning following an illness or injury.126  The child would need therapy, 
not to recover from an illness (as would be the case for the patient recovering from 




126 Rosenbaum et al., supra note 21, at 14, 15-18. 
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a stroke), but in order to develop physical movement.  Traditional insurance principles 
would deny this coverage, a reality borne out by cases challenging the limits of  
commercial insurance for children with developmental disabilities.127  The Medicaid 
EPSDT benefit would mandate this coverage at the earliest point of  diagnosis, and 
coverage would be ongoing as long as clinically necessary.128  Were a Medicaid 
managed care contract not to cover the service, the Medicaid agency would be 
obligated to finance it directly and supplementally.129 
For this reason, a close read of  Medicaid and SCHIP coverage agreements 
against the global provisions of  state plans becomes essential when attempting to 
understand the fine points of  coverage differentials in the two programs.  The 
contract research phase of  the project was conducted through the development of  
a special data base created by George Washington University in 1994 and updated 
three times over the ensuing time period.130   The data base for this study consists 
of  contract documents between contractors and Medicaid and SCHIP agencies 
covering the 2001-2002 time period, and these contract provisions can be viewed 
online.131 
For this particular study, we focused on a subset of  all states using managed 
care in Medicaid and SCHIP as of  2002.  Of  the 27 state SCHIP programs using 
managed care as of  the study date, 12 State SCHIP agencies effectuated their 
purchasing by “piggybacking” onto the state Medicaid contract; that is, these state 
SCHIP agencies used the Medicaid contract, with variations essentially limited to 
coverage, payment rates, and certain business terms.132  Medicaid enrolled children 
in these 12 states would be entitled to supplemental or residual coverage, while 
SCHIP-enrolled children would receive supplemental benefits only to the extent 
covered in the separately administered SCHIP plan.  With respect to contractual 
127 See e.g., Bedrick v. Travelers 93 F.3d 149 (1996); Rosenbaum et al., supra note 120; Rosenbaum et 
al., supra note 33. 
128 Rosenbaum & Sonosky, supra note 60, at 2. 
129 1997 Nationwide Study, supra note 118. 
130 Sara Rosenbaum et al., Center for Health Service Research and Policy, Negotiating the New Health 
System: A Nationwide Study of  Medicaid Managed Care Contracts, (June 1999) [hereinafter 1999 Nationwide 
Study], at http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/managed_care.htm (last visited September 2004); 1997 
Nationwide Study, supra note 118. 
131 Id. 
132 Rosenbaum, supra note 3, at 6-7. 
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benefits however, children in these states would receive identical – or nearly identical 
– coverage unless expressly stated in the agreement.133 
 In 15 states however (approximately 60% of  all SCHIP states using managed 
care products), the state SCHIP agency utilized a completely separate agreement 
with its contractors at the time of  the study.134  These separate agreements might 
therefore vary considerably from their Medicaid counterparts with respect to 
coverage.135  We focused on these states, because we concluded that they would 
most clearly illustrate the degree of  contractual distinctions drawn between the 
two forms of  managed care products. 
We knew from our previous work that state SCHIP plans offered lesser 
benefits in certain key areas than the scope of  coverage found in state Medicaid 
plans.   We then examined the two sets of  contracts in these 15 separate-contract 
states and compared their terms to the information on state plan coverage under 
both programs which we already had gleaned from our review of  the state plans. 
Where relevant, we have summarized the underlying state plan information in order 
to aid understanding of  the extent to which the contracts follow or depart from 
their respective state plans. 
SCHIP and Medicaid contracts tend to be exhaustive and detailed and are 
far more prescriptive than most privately purchased agreements. This tendency to 
tightly manage contractors is undoubtedly an outgrowth of  the limited budgets 
under which states operate and the low-income of  their beneficiaries.136   State 
agencies cannot afford “point-of-service” network options, and enrollees cannot 
afford to augment their managed care benefits with out of  pocket expenditures for 
the services of  balance billing, non-network providers.137  With tighter networks 
come greater concerns over access to covered benefits, and as a result, SCHIP and 
Medicaid agencies pay particular attention to how care is organized and delivered.138 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 7. 
135 Id. at 9. 
136 Sara Rosenbaum, Approaches to Assuring Quality Health Care Through State Contracts with Managed 
Care Plans, in ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: PROMISES AND PROSPECTS FOR LOW INCOME AMERICANS 223- 
250, 226-227 (Lillie-Blanton, et al., eds., 1999). 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
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Because health care is so vast, perhaps the best way to understand how 
these contracts operate, as well as their limitations, is to select treatments for one or 
more specific conditions and view the agreements from a particular sub-population 
or condition-specific vantage point. 
For this article we selected early childhood development as the frame through 
which the contracts would be analyzed.  Early childhood development has become 
a particular focus of  our work for several reasons. First, it is a fascinating topic 
from an insurance perspective because as noted earlier, the vast bulk of  early 
intervention health services fall within the scope of  Medicaid but outside the more 
conventional insurance norms reflected in the premium-support approach to SCHIP 
coverage.  Second, a great deal of  attention has been focused on early child 
development in recent years as a result of  the Bush Administration’s No Child Left 
Behind education reform legislation, which has reinforced Congressional interest 
in early childhood.139 Since the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
prohibits the use of federal funds to finance health therapies for infants and toddlers 
receiving early intervention services, the extent to which health services promoting 
development are found in Medicaid and SCHIP becomes highly important to low- 
income children.140 
A third reason to consider early intervention as the candidate treatment for 
this study was that as research into early childhood development has intensified in 
recent years, experts have been able to more clearly articulate the standard of  care 
that would be appropriate to the earliest possible identification of  developmental 
delays, as well as the types of  health interventions that the evidence suggests would 
be effective in reducing the potential for delay and ensure early access to treatment.141 
139 The No Child Left Behind Act of  2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110. 
140 §1903(c) of  the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1396b(c). 
141 See MICHAEL REGALADO & NEIL HALFON, PRIMARY CARE SERVICES: PROMOTING OPTIMAL CHILD 
DEVELOPMENT FROM BIRTH TO THREE YEARS, (The Commonwealth Fund, NY, 2002); Neil Halfon et 
al., Building a Bridge from Birth to School: Improving Developmental and Behavioral Health Services for Young 
Children, at http://www.cmwf.org/programs/child/halfon_bridge_bn_564.pdf  (May 2003) (last 
accessed October 20, 2003). 
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Figure 5 lists interventions found in the literature. (See Figure 5 pg. 35). These 
interventions were used to create a taxonomy for contractual specification purposes, 
so that  findings could be presented regarding the relationship between these 
interventions and specification of  terms. The fact that a contract might be silent on 
a specific intervention does not necessarily signify that an intervention is not 
furnished by the contractor, only that the intervention is not a clear specification 
of  the agreement.142  A managed care contractor obviously has discretion to furnish 
comprehensive childhood development services; however, research into managed 
care industry custom and practice suggests that few managed care companies 
specialize in comprehensive child development and consider the intervention to be 
of  limited relevance unless specified in the contract and/or specifically “incentivized” 
through payment structure.143 
Using the childhood development intervention, we fashioned the following 
series of  queries to the contract database in order to assess the relationship between 
early intervention standards and contract specifications: 
1) Coverage of  preventive services: Whether contracts list specific elements 
of  coverage for preventive services for young children, including a 
comprehensive medical and developmental screen, lead assessments (in view 
of  the impact of  elevated lead exposure on childhood growth and 
development) and anticipatory guidance. 
2) Continuity of  care: Whether contracts require contractors to ensure 
continuity of  care between health care arrangements predating children’s 
enrollment and post-enrollment care. 
3) Medical necessity standard: Whether contracts define the standard of  
medical necessity to be used by contractors and, if  so, whether the standard 
followed the commercial standard of  “restoring an individual to normal 
functioning” or the “growth and development” standard used for children 
in Medicaid. 
142 1997 Nationwide Study, supra note 118. 
143 Carolyn Berry, Pamela Butler, Linda Perloff, and Peter Budetti, Child Development Services in Medicaid 
Managed Care Organizations: What Does It Take? 106 PEDIATRICS 191-8 (July 2000). 
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4) Provider network composition: Whether contracts require the contractor 
to include child development specialists (e.g., pediatricians specializing in 
child development, lactation counselors, social workers, etc.) in their network 
of  participating providers. 
5) Supportive child development activities: Whether contracts require 
contractors to undertake special child development activities such as health 
education, and outreach efforts. 
6) Care coordination with other key child development programs: Whether 
contracts require contractors to coordinate care with early intervention 
services for infants and toddlers under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act, which includes early intervention services for infants and 
toddlers at risk of  developmental delay. 
7) Compensation linked to the quality of  early childhood care: Whether 
contracts provide for financial incentives (positive, such as bonuses, or 
negative, such as penalties) for the contractor to ensure health care access 
and/or quality of  care for young children. 
35 
ASSESSMENT: ASSESSMENT SERVICES INCLUDE 
EVALUATION OF INFORMATION FROM PARENTS, 
DEVELOPMENTAL MONITORING (INCLUDING 
SCREENING FOR DEVELOPMENTAL PROBLEMS WHEN 
INDICATED), PSYCHOSOCIAL ASSESSMENT, PARENT- 
CHILD OBSERVATION, AND ASSESSMENTS OF CHILD 
BEHAVIOR. 
EDUCATION: EDUCATION SERVICES INCLUDE 
ANTICIPATORY GUIDANCE ABOUT THE PARENT- 
INFANT RELATIONSHIP, CHILD BEHAVIOR, AND 
VARIOUS DEVELOPMENTAL ISSUES (E.G., PROMOTING 
HEALTHY SLEEP HABITS AND DISCIPLINE PRACTICES) 
AS WELL AS PARENTING EDUCATION IN DIFFERENT 
FORMATS, SUCH AS CLASSES, SUPPORT GROUPS, AND 
INSTRUCTION BY A PHYSICIAN OR NURSE. 
INTERVENTION: INTERVENTION SERVICES INCLUDE 
COUNSELING IN THE OFFICE SETTING, TELEPHONE 
INFORMATION LINES, AND HOME VISITATION. 
CARE COORDINATION: CARE COORDINATION 
REFERS TO THE MANAGEMENT OF SERVICE NEEDS 
SUCH AS REFERRALS FOR DIAGNOSTIC ASSESSMENTS 
OR SPECIALISTS. 
Figure 5.  Pediatric Interventions Related to Early Childhood 
Development144 
144 Halfon et al., supra note 16. 
36 JOURNAL OF HEALTH     VOL. 1 NO. 1 2004 
                &  BIOMEDICAL LAW 
SCHIP Plans versus SCHIP Contracts 
The findings are presented on Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 shows the extent of  
childhood development-related coverage in states with both separately-administered 
SCHIP plans and separately-administered SCHIP contracts.  Because coverage of  
all services shown in Table 1 are mandatory in Medicaid, no similar comparison is 
necessary: whatever might be excluded from the Medicaid contract is covered as a 
residual service.145  But the same is not true with SCHIP, since supplemental, 
Medicaid-level coverage is an option but is not required. (See Table I Appendix). 
Table 1 shows that states that administer separate SCHIP programs do not 
report specific coverage of  certain aspects of  child development services that would 
be considered required in Medicaid.  For example, only 7 states report coverage of  
developmental assessments, only 2, lead screening, and only 1, anticipatory guidance. 
In all states, well-baby and well-child care would be covered as a basic SCHIP 
benefit, and presumably at least a threshold level of  anticipatory guidance would 
be part of  any well-child encounter between a pediatric health professional and a 
parent or caretaker.  This same assumption, however, cannot be made about 
comprehensive developmental assessments and assessment of  elevated levels of  
lead in children’s blood, since both interventions are relatively resource intensive, 
and in the case of  developmental assessments, time consuming.   Table 1 also 
shows that only 2 state SCHIP plans provide for the type of  preventive standard of  
medical necessity that is required in the case of Medicaid. 
Of  great interest however, Table 1 also shows that unlike Medicaid, SCHIP 
contracts actually can be broader than states’ SCHIP plans. That is, certain aspects 
of  developmental interventions that are not covered in a state’s SCHIP plan 
nonetheless show up in a contract as an expectation of  the managed care 
organization.   Thus, for example, 7 of  the 15 states whose plan and contract elements 
are displayed show coverage of  developmental assessments in their state plans, yet 
10 list developmental assessments as an expectation of  their contractors.  The same 
is true for vision care, immunizations and lead screening, and for medical necessity. 
145 Sara Rosenbaum et al., Center for Health Service Research and Policy, Negotiating the New Health 
System: A Nationwide Study of  Medicaid Managed Care Contracts, (June 1999) [hereinafter 1999 Nationwide 
Study], at http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/managed_care.htm (last visited September 2004); 1997 
Nationwide Study, supra note 118. 
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SCHIP Contracts versus Medicaid Contracts 
Table 2 shows that while SCHIP contracts are more expansive than state 
SCHIP plans in certain respects, the contracts are less expansive than Medicaid. 
Not only is Medicaid coverage broader than SCHIP from a state plan perspective, 
but Medicaid agencies are willing to hold their contractors to broader coverage and 
management duties than is the case with SCHIP agencies.   For example, several 
states whose SCHIP contracts specify well-child care nonetheless do not specify 
developmental assessments. Very few SCHIP contracts specify lead screening 
compared to the Medicaid contracts. Whereas 11 Medicaid contracts build the 
program’s preventive definition of  medical necessity into the documents, this level 
of  coverage is specified in only 6 SCHIP contracts.  (See Table 2 Appendix). 
Connecticut’s and Colorado’s SCHIP contracts show the contrast between 
a preventive standard of  medical necessity that captures the thrust of  the Medicaid 
standard, and one that is more consistent with traditional commercial insurance 
principles that focus coverage on treatment of  defined medical  conditions: 
Connecticut:  “Medically necessary/Medical necessity: Health care provided to correct or diminish 
the adverse effects of  a medical condition or mental illness; to assist an individual in attaining or 
maintaining an optimal level of  health; to diagnose a condition or prevent a medical condition 
from occurring. . .”146 
Colorado:  “‘Medically Necessary,’ or ‘Medical Necessity: A Covered Service shall be 
deemed Medically Necessary if, in a manner consistent with accepted standards of  medical 
practice, it is: 1. consistent with the symptom, diagnosis and treatment of  a Member’s 
medical condition; 2. widely accepted by the practitioner’s peer group as efficacious and 
reasonably safe based upon scientific evidence; 3. not Experimental or Investigational; 4. 
not solely for cosmetic purposes; 5. not solely for the convenience of  the Member, Subscriber, 
physician or other provider; 6. the most appropriate level of  care that can be safely 
provided to the Member;  7. failure to provide the Covered Service would adversely affect 
the Member’s health.” 147 
146 Sara Rosenbaum, Colleen Sonosky, Karen Shaw, and Marcie Zakheim, Center for Health Service 
Research and Policy, Negotiating the New Health System: A Nationwide Study of  Medicaid Managed Care 
Contracts, (4th Ed. 2000 at p. 11-14) [hereinafter 2000 Nationwide Study], at http:// 
www.gwhealthpolicy.org/managed_care.htm (last visited September 2004). 
147 Id. at 7-8. 
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In the case of  Connecticut’s contract, a treatment is considered medically 
necessary for SCHIP children if  (as is the case with Medicaid) the intervention is 
aimed at assisting an individual to attain and maintain growth and development  or 
is designed to prevent a medical condition from occurring.148  In the case of  Colorado, 
a treatment is considered medically necessary only if  aimed at a diagnosable medical 
condition (which is not always the case with slowed or delayed development in 
children). Furthermore, treatment will be considered necessary only if  failure to 
furnish the treatment would adversely affect health.149  Failure to respond to a 
developmental delay in a child has many adverse consequences, but adverse health 
may not be one of  them. 
Differences between Medicaid and SCHIP contracts go beyond coverage. 
Anticipatory care is significantly less common as a specific performance requirement 
in SCHIP contracts, as are expectations of  continuity of  care (related to situations 
in which children enrolling in a plan are already under treatment and must be 
integrated into a potentially new network), coordination with early intervention 
services offered by other public agencies such as state maternal and child health 
agencies, and other outreach and child development activities.150  Most strikingly 
perhaps, “incentivization” of  access and quality is a universal feature of  Medicaid 
managed care contracts in the case of  treatment and management of  young children, 
but this is not the case in SCHIP contracts.151 
Discussion 
The SCHIP legislation had two parents. One was widely hailed at the time 
of  enactment, while the other remained obscured in the face of  back patting and 
accolades of  bipartisanship and health reform.  President Clinton, who signed the 
1996 welfare law once the Medicaid block grant was removed, extravagantly 
proclaimed SCHIP the largest expansion in coverage for children since the original 
148 Id. at 11-14. 
149 Id. at 7-8. 
150 See Table 2. 
151 Id. 
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enactment of  Medicaid.152 This claim, of  course, overlooked the doubling of  
Medicaid’s pediatric rolls as a result of  the legislative expansions during the 1980s. 
Praise for SCHIP also helped gloss over the legislation’s more sobering dimensions, 
including the loss of  the legal entitlement and the elimination of  nearly all coverage 
rules.153 
Indeed, in our view it is not too harsh to argue that in the long run, SCHIP 
may do less to help children and families than harm them by helping to further 
destabilize the already shaky Medicaid picture.  If  total destabilization occurs, and 
if  SCHIP (along with the Bush Administration’s Section 1115 demonstrations) is 
any indicator of  what the successor program will look like, then there is indeed 
much to think about, particularly where the welfare of  children and adults with 
significant health needs is concerned.  With its ability to act as a substitute for 
Medicaid even where its benefits are essentially unknown and market-dictated, 
SCHIP has been, in some key  ways, a warm-up for the Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of  2003, which completely eliminated 
Medicaid prescription drug coverage for so-called “dual enrollees” (arguably 
Medicaid’s most sick and most disabled beneficiaries) in favor of  a new Medicare 
premium support system, whose benefit design is essentially unknown and virtually 
entirely in the hands of  participating plans.154 Like EPSDT, Medicaid prescription 
drug benefits are one of  the law’s most comprehensive aspects.  With supplemental 
Medicaid prescription drug benefits eliminated for dual enrollees, they are, like 
SCHIP children with physical and mental disabilities, essentially reliant on the 
market’s willingness to customize its products to their needs.155 
Of course one critical issue delineates SCHIP from the Medicaid prescription 
drug situation. States could have used their authority under SCHIP to duplicate 
152 Rosenbaum et al., supra note 2, at 33.  “U.S. Budget: Clinton Signs Bill Adding Kid’s Coverage, 
Changing Medicare, Medicaid Programs,” 5 Health Care Pol’y Rep., (BNA) (commenting on the 
twenty-four billion dollar health insurance program established for uninsured children) at 32 d3 
(Aug. 11, 1997); The White House Office of  the Press Secretary (September 29, 2000) President 
Clinton Announces Approximately 2.5 Million Children Have Enrolled in the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program at http://www.ed.gov/PressReleases/09-2000/wh-0929a.html; See also, e.g., Michael Levin- 
Epstein, (2000) “How We Got it Anyway: The Clinton Health Plan Never Died,” Managed Care 
(on-line) at http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/0010/0010.clinton.html. 
153 See Policy Brief, supra note 3; Rosenbaum, et. al., supra note 2, at 36-37; Rosenbaum & Sonosky, 
supra note 12, at 87; Rosenbaum et al., supra note 21. 
154 See New Drug Law, supra note 24. 
155 Id. 
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Medicaid although at a higher federal match rate.156  Indeed, a number of  states did 
exactly this rather than establish a separate program.157  But a separate SCHIP 
program was the norm, and the states which pursued separate programs did so to 
avoid not only legal entitlements, but also, as this study shows, Medicaid-level 
comprehensive coverage.  Once states were freed of  Medicaid’s conditions for 
children – an enforceable legal entitlement, defined benefits that extend beyond 
the limits of  actuarial coverage norms, and the legal obligation to supplement 
coverage of  managed care plan benefits and services – they expanded coverage 
rapidly, but on their terms, and only up to the limits of  the federal contributions 
they received.158   Indeed, waiting lists have become a feature of  state SCHIP 
programs.159  Furthermore, in terms of  benefit design, separately administered 
SCHIP expansions followed the specifications of  the actuarial benchmarks specified 
in the statute, not the broad concept of  coverage envisioned in Medicaid.160    The 
difference between the two approaches to pediatric coverage is considerable and 
shows up clearly when one examines SCHIP and Medicaid limits using the standards 
of  care applicable to early intervention programs for young children at risk of  
developmental delay. 
Much is written in the law and in political and policy essays about “legislative 
intent.”  There are many instances in which a law must be placed in context before 
its textual meaning becomes truly discernible.161  SCHIP is not one of  those laws; 
its true intent shows up on the face of  the text itself, from the explicit assertion that 
“nothing in this title shall be construed as providing an individual with an entitlement 
to child health assistance,” to the use of  a premium support approach to coverage.162 
A detailed inspection of  both the law and subsequent state implementation 
of  its provisions confirms what one may have hypothesized might occur during an 
era notable for its rush to abandon social welfare entitlements for the poor: in the 
156 See cases cited supra note 83; Title XXI of  the Social Security Act §2105(b); 42 U.S.C. §1397ee 
(b). 
157 See Figure 4. 
158 Chang & Kenney, supra note 108 , at 52. 
159 Id. at 57. 
160 Rosenbaum et al., supra note 21. 
161 See cases cited supra note 33. 
162 Rosenbaum et al., supra note 74, at 77. 
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main, states used their SCHIP allotments to extend to low-income children a far 
more conventional and limited form of  coverage than is possible under Medicaid. 
Medicaid reflects an era of  public policy support for legal entitlements for 
the poor and disenfranchised.163  Medicaid not only established what ultimately has 
been interpreted as a federal legal entitlement, but did so in remarkably clear and 
broad terms in the case of  children.  For children, Medicaid coverage operates at a 
level which has virtually no parallel in the insurance market. There is no “actuarial 
benchmark” for Medicaid.164 
SCHIP is a product of  a different era.  Under programs such as SCHIP, 
low-income persons no longer are legally entitled to benefits.165  They receive what 
Charles Reich termed “largesse,” up to the limits of  fixed aggregate expenditure 
caps, and without regard to individual need.166  Furthermore, the design of  this 
largesse is what the market will bear. As the actuarial benchmark shifts ever downward 
in the face of  a declining willingness on the part of  insurers and group purchasers 
to invest in comprehensive coverage, so too, presumably, will SCHIP and similar 
benefits for the poor, since their terms of  coverage are pegged to the market rather 
than objective tests of  reasonableness. 
At the same time, it is important not to wax overly poetic about Medicaid. 
It is essential to remember that the very aspects of  Medicaid that make it so 
substantively strong for children also have served as its political Achilles Heel. So 
disliked is its individually enforceable legal entitlement and the comprehensiveness 
of  its entitlement terms that states simply refused to take advantage of  the program’s 
pediatric coverage options.167  Over the past generation, some of  the most intense 
litigation involving enforcement of  federal Medicaid rights has involved children 
163 Stevens & Stevens, supra note 56; Charles Reich, The New Property. 73 YALE L. J. 733, 786 (1964); 
RAND ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (Foundation Press, New 
York, NY) (1997 & Supp. 2002); Jost, supra note 35. 
164 Rosenbaum et al., supra note 21, at 6-8. 
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3, at 5. 
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167 Sara Rosenbaum & Sonosky, supra note 12, at 85. 
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and EPSDT; no wonder states have a strong dislike for the program.168  Thus, while 
one can mourn the lack of  political support for heavily enriched health benefits for 
the nation’s poorest children, undifferentiated mourning is not particularly helpful 
to the 20-plus million children who stand to lose their Medicaid entitlement if  the 
program structure is substantially and fundamentally altered, an increasingly likely 
reality.169 
It is clear that the pediatric health system needs a source of funding with 
the flexibility and depth displayed by Medicaid.  The evidence regarding the standard 
of  care for children during early child development and later in life as they develop 
special health needs, underscores the need to finance the range of  health services 
that help achieve optimal growth and development among children.170  There is a 
need for child health financing that is unbound by insurance norms and that can 
respond to health problems in infancy and childhood which require long-term 
interventions in schools and community settings.  It is possible to conceptualize a 
financing scheme that can supplement what is offered in the private market; indeed, 
such an approach can serve as a backstop and a form of  “stop loss” by supplementing 
the very benefits and services that the insurance market will never realistically confer 
on enrollees.  This ability to undergird and support insurance products can be seen 
in Medicaid supplementation of  managed care products for children, and the absence 
of  such a feature in SCHIP is as serious a problem as SCHIP’s potential to experience 
enrollment caps because of  under-financing.171 
The real question is whether the fundamental mission of  Medicaid to support 
a broad range of  health services for uninsurable populations of  all ages can be met 
only through an individually enforceable legal entitlement.  Clearly the answer to 
this question is “no.”  In his analysis of  health systems in other nations, Timothy 
Stoltzfus Jost points out that individually enforceable, legal entitlements are peculiarly 
American and that other nations use global budgeting, system support, and 
168 Jane Perkins et al. (2004) Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis & Treatment Case Docket Chapel 
Hill, NC: National Health Law Program (NHelp) at http://www.healthlaw.org/pubs/ 
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investments on a population level to achieve adequate levels of  resource allocation.172 
The key of  course is universality. 
Thus, at least where children are concerned, a plausible policy option would 
be a universal child health insurance program with standard benefits and coverage 
rules, coupled with a comprehensive program of  state grants to develop and support 
systems of  care capable of  furnishing supplemental child development and family 
support services in community settings where they are needed and where they 
rightfully should be furnished.  Many of  the services most needed by children with 
nascent – or actual – physical and mental disabilities (and their adult counterparts) 
are as much educational or social as they are health care in nature, and optimally the 
service is woven into the normal daily life of  children in school and at play.173 
The critical issue in this plausible option is the universality of  the model. 
Where only poor children are relegated to benchmark coverage and grant 
supplementation, the inevitable result appears to be under-financing.174   Another 
way to say this is that, were all children to be covered by SCHIP rather than merely 
a slice of  low-income uninsured children, mental health benefits never would have 
been classified as an “additional” service, dental care would not be non-existent, 
and there would not be waiting lists for coverage.175 
Perhaps it seems foolish to consider universality at a time of  retrenchment 
in social policy.  On the other hand, the crisis in health care finance now leaves one 
in four children dependent on public insurance and fewer than two in five with 
employer coverage.  If  Medicaid is to be fully debated, then there may in fact be no 
more appropriate time to abandon backsliding and futile incrementalism in favor 
of  bold reform, and no more appropriate population on whose behalf  to do so. 
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